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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
            
No. 05-1245
            
LILIANA
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES;
SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
Respondents
          
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
United States Department of Justice 
Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA Nos. A79-319-018, A79-319-019)
         
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 16, 2005
Before: SLOVITER, SMITH, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: December 21, 2005)
____
        OPINION OF THE COURT
         
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge.
Hendriesoon was included in Liliana’s asylum application, and the IJ treated their1
claims for relief collectively with Liliana as lead respondent.  However, it appears from the
petition for review to this Court, as well as from the Brief in Support of the Respondent’s
Appeal to the BIA, that only Liliana has challenged the denial of her application.  Since we
will deny the petition for review regarding Liliana’s application, Hendriesoon’s derivative
application for relief is necessarily included.
2
Petitioner Liliana and her husband Hendriesoon,  both Catholic, ethnic Chinese1
natives of Indonesia, seek review of the decision of the Board of Immigration (“BIA”)
affirming without opinion the denial by the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) of their applications for
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”), and the grant by the IJ of voluntary departure.  The BIA had jurisdiction pursuant
to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1.  This Court has jurisdiction over the petition for review pursuant to 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  For the reasons set forth below, we will deny the petition for review.
I.
Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we state the facts only as they
pertain to our analysis. 
Liliana, who was born in Indonesia, entered the United States in New York City on
July 9, 2000, using a non-immigrant visa.  Liliana’s husband, Hendriesoon, entered at the
same time.  Both Liliana and Hendriesoon conceded removability and appeared before an IJ.
Liliana, the only witness, testified that she had been harassed by native Indonesians since she
was a student, that she had been spit on and had stones thrown at her while the name “China”
3was called.  She testified that while riding a bus once, she was harassed and “fondled.”  She
testified to one specific event on May 12, 2000, in which she was accosted by a group of
people while she had stopped to change a flat tire; the crowd allegedly banged on her car and
broke her windshield.  She received cuts from the glass.  At the time, she testified, she was
wearing a cross around her neck.  She also complained to her supervisor at a factory
regarding intimidation there, including punctured tires, but her complaints were ignored.  A
month later, one of the churches she attended was allegedly attacked and damaged by
Muslims.  Liliana also described her attendance at various churches in Indonesia, and at a
church in the United States.
In an oral decision dated October 17, 2003, the IJ denied both Liliana and
Hendriesoon’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
CAT.  The IJ granted voluntary departure.  While the IJ found that Liliana was credible
regarding specific incidents, the IJ held that Liliana had failed to establish past persecution
on account of either religion or ethnicity.  The IJ further found that while Liliana had credibly
demonstrated a subjective fear of persecution should she return to Indonesia, there was
insufficient objective evidence to support a fear of future persecution based on either religion
or ethnicity.  Liliana timely filed a petition for review with the BIA, challenging the IJ’s
Order.  The BIA affirmed without opinion in a Per Curiam Order dated December 27, 2004.
Liliana then filed this timely petition for review.
II.
4Where the BIA affirms without opinion, this Court reviews the IJ’s opinion.  Abdulai
v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001).  While Liliana challenges the IJ’s
determinations as errors of law, they are instead findings of fact that are properly reviewed
under the substantial evidence standard.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Gao v. Ashcroft,
299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002).  Such determinations are upheld unless a “reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary,” considering the totality of the
circumstances.  Gao, 299 F.3d at 272 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).  To establish an
asylum claim, an applicant must show either past persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of, inter alia, religion or ethnicity.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).  The
applicant must prove a credible “subjective fear of persecution that is supported by objective
evidence that persecution is a reasonable probability.”  Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477,
495-96 (3d Cir. 2001).
III.
On appeal, Liliana argues only her asylum claim.  The withholding of removal and
CAT claims are therefore deemed waived.  See Nagle v. Alspach, 8 F.3d 141, 143 (3d Cir.
1993).
IV.
We recently addressed a similar situation in Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530 (3d Cir.
2005), and many of our findings there are relevant today.  In Lie we affirmed the BIA’s
holding that incidents – far more serious than those the IJ found credible in Liliana’s case –
In Lie, we also held that absent evidence beyond simple ethnic slurs, “the evidence2
of general ethnic difficulties would not compel a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the
intrusions were ‘on account of’ Lie’s ethnicity or religion.”  396 F.3d at 535-36.
We also agree with the IJ that the damage to her church cannot be considered the3
“persecution” of Liliana, when she was not present during the incident, and was not harmed.
5
failed to rise to the level of past persecution on account of a statutorily-protected ground.
The Catholic, ethnic Chinese petitioners in Lie detailed two robberies, the calling of names
such as “Chinese pig,” and a stabbing; the petitioners showed evidence that they were
Catholic, and attended mass on Sundays. 
Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion here that the incidents detailed by
Liliana similarly fail to rise to the level of “persecution,” even if they were motivated by her
religion or ethnicity (which we do not conclude).   Persecution is “extreme conduct,” not2
simply harassment or injury.  Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 n.10 (3d Cir. 1993); see also
id. at 1240 (“threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that
they constitute a threat to life or freedom”), quoted in Lie, 396 F.3d at 536.  The IJ here
found Liliana’s testimony regarding specific incidents credible, but those incidents do not
show persecution.  Liliana’s tires were punctured, she was harassed on a bus, and stones were
thrown at her car.  These incidents were “isolated criminal acts, perpetrated by unknown
assailants,” and are not “sufficiently severe to be considered persecution.”  Lie, 396 F.3d at
536.3
Substantial evidence also supports the IJ’s conclusion that even accepting that Liliana
had a subjective fear of persecution upon return to Indonesia, the IJ could not find objective
On appeal, Liliana makes much of the IJ’s statements that Liliana was merely a4
member of a church, and not a religious activist proselytizing in the community.  The IJ did
not rest her decision on this ground, although it certainly does support the IJ’s decision that
Liliana would not be targeted on an individual basis for religious reasons.
6
facts to support the reasonableness of that fear.  The IJ reviewed the country reports from the
State Department, and articles from the Christian Science Monitor and CNN.  On appeal,
Liliana appears to confuse the requirement of objective facts with a request for corroborating
evidence.  The IJ accepted Liliana’s testimony as credible.  An objective basis for a fear of
future persecution, however, is a separate and indispensable requirement designed to ensure
that “a reasonable person in the alien’s circumstances would fear persecution if returned to
the country.”  Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 469 (3d Cir. 2003).  Contrary to Liliana’s
repeated assertions on appeal, we do not look at the objective evidence through Liliana’s
eyes; to do so would be to render it a subjective inquiry.
In Lie, we affirmed the BIA’s holding that the petitioner there had “failed to establish
either that she faces an individualized risk of persecution or that there is a ‘pattern or
practice’ of persecution of Chinese Christians in Indonesia.”  396 F.3d at 537.  Here,
Liliana’s siblings remain in Indonesia, and she has presented no individualized evidence that
she has been, or would be, singled out for persecution.   The IJ reviewed the objective4
evidence submitted and found that laws and practices discriminating against ethnic Chinese
in Indonesia had been abolished; that recent articles suggested that Muslims and Catholics
were cooperating in protesting American involvement in the Iraq war; and that current
7country reports did not support the reasonableness of Liliana’s fear of future persecution.
Substantial evidence supports these conclusions.  See Lie, 396 F.3d at 537-38 (rejecting the
argument that attacks in Indonesia “primarily wrought by fellow citizens and not the result
of governmental action or acquiescence . . . . constitute[d] a pattern or practice of persecution
against Chinese Christians”).
V.
Liliana also argues that the BIA erred by affirming without opinion the IJ’s Order.
Because the IJ did not err in this case, and because we have repeatedly upheld the overall
constitutionality of the BIA’s affirmance without opinion procedures, we reject this
argument.  See Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc).
VI.
Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusions that Liliana failed to show either
past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution.  For the foregoing reasons,
then, we will deny the petition for review.  We have considered all other arguments made by
the parties on appeal, and conclude that no further discussion is necessary.
